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CAVEAT EMPTOR:  LESSONS FROM VOLKSWAGEN’S LEMON 
PURCHASE
T E R E N C E  J .  L A U
Terence J. Lau is an assistant professor of 
Business Law at the University of Dayton. 
He is the former in-house counsel to 
Ford Motor Company, specializing in 
international trade and transactions 
practice, and former director of ASEAN 
Governmental Affairs, Ford Operations 
Thailand.
This article is an adaptation of text 
prepared for remarks by the author at the 
University of Dayton School of Law Fifth 
Annual Licensing Intellectual Property 
Seminar, March 20-21, 2003.
INTRODUCTION
In the spring of  1998, German automobile 
manufacturer Volkswagen AG paid almost 
$1 billion for Rolls Royce but did not 
acquire the Rolls Royce trademark, which 
was ultimately sold to rival BMW for a mere 
$65 million.  The story of  Volkswagen’s 
botched acquisition is a reminder of  the 
importance of  careful due diligence when 
engaged in international acquisitions. 
In Part I of  this Article, Volkswagen’s 
steps (and mis-steps) are retraced and 
solutions are offered for counsel engaged 
in international transactions with the hope 
that the practitioner with little experience 
in this area can avoid similarly embarrassing 
and costly errors.1  
For many small to medium-sized 
companies, the task of  expanding 
internationally is a daunting proposition. 
In addition to the business equation, 
the prospect of  establishing a foreign 
subsidiary or forming a joint venture with a 
local partner is simply beyond the resource 
capabilities of  many domestic enterprises. 
Licensing is therefore an affordable and 
efficient way for companies to expand 
overseas.  Licensing comes in many 
permutations and sizes but is essentially a 
contract not to sue, by the licensor, as long 
as certain conditions are met. In addition 
to due diligence, therefore, international 
corporate counsel should be aware of  
unique contracting issues that arise in 
international intellectual property licenses. 
In Part II of  this Article, recommendations 
are offered on how to draft contract clauses 
for international licensing use.
Finally, a discussion of  licensing 
technology that is U.S. origin would not 
be complete without a brief  discussion 
of  the U.S. export control regime counsel 
should be aware of.  Part III of  this Article 
provides a brief  introduction to that control 
regime.  Penalties for violations are stiff  and 
potentially ruinous, and enforcement is at an 
all-time high due to security concerns. This 
is information that all international counsel 
should be aware of, not just experts in the 
field.  
I. AN ACQUISITION GOES 
AWRY – WHERE WERE 
THE TRADEMARK LICENSE 
ATTORNEYS?
Within a month,
Ere the salt of  most unrighteous tears
Had left the flushing in her galled eyes,
She married.  O, most wicked speed, to post
With such dexterity to incestuous sheets!
-- Hamlet (1.2.153-157)2
When Will Shakespeare wrote Hamlet’s first 
soliloquy, he could not have foreseen a world 
where his words would have significance for 
the breakup of  one of  the United Kingdom’s 
most venerable companies, Rolls-Royce.  Just 
as Hamlet despaired over his uncle’s murder 
of  his father and his mother Gertrude’s 
subsequent marriage to the murderous 
Claudius, the news that Rolls-Royce (and its 
sister Bentley) was being sold to German 
automaker Volkswagen AG in 1998 and that 
arch-rival BMW would own the trademark 
to Rolls-Royce starting in 2003 was greeted 
with derision and despair in Great Britain. 
The end result, however, was far from pre-
ordained.  Sloppy negotiating, abysmal due 
diligence, and a rush to “get the deal done” led 
to the incestuous relationship between BMW 
and Volkswagen, and the “children” of  that 
relationship:  Rolls-Royce and Bentley.
To understand the convoluted history of  
the Rolls-Royce/Bentley saga, it is important 
to trace the historical route the entities 
involved took.  Since 1904, when Henry 
Royce met Charles Rolls,3 Rolls-Royce has 
represented the very best in British motoring 
and has set the world standard for vehicles 
that catered to the ultra-rich.   In 1931, Rolls-
Royce purchased Bentley,4 and, thus, began a 
fruitful and prosperous relationship that saw 
Rolls-Royce cater to the ultra high-end luxury 
market while Bentley (which often were 
Rolls-Royce vehicles thinly disguised, i.e., no 
flying lady, formally known as the “Sprit of  
Ecstasy”) catered to the “sporty” end of  the 
same niche market.  Meanwhile, during the 
Second World War, Rolls-Royce focused its 
attention on manufacturing aircraft engines, 
a venture that continued successfully after 
the war.  In 1971, after financial difficulties 
with product development of  a jet engine 
designed for use on commercial airliners, 
the entire company (then Rolls-Royce PLC) 
went into receivership, and the vehicle 
and aviation companies were separated.5 
Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd., producing 
both Rolls-Royce and Bentley vehicles, was 
formed in 1973, and in 1980, was acquired by 
defense manufacturer Vickers PLC.  During 
the 1971 receivership, however, Rolls-Royce 
PLC maintained ownership of  the “Rolls-
Royce” trademarks and licensed the use of  
the mark to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. in 
a 1973 trademark license agreement.  One of  
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the clauses in that agreement provided that 
while Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. would 
have the rights to manufacture Rolls-Royce 
and Bentley motor vehicles, Rolls-Royce 
PLC would maintain exclusive control of  the 
Rolls-Royce mark in the event Rolls-Royce 
Motor Cars Ltd. (the licensee) was sold to a 
foreign owner.6
By the late 1990’s, Rolls-Royce Motor 
Cars Ltd. had run into financial difficulties 
and was having difficulty raising sufficient 
cash to invest in new product development. 
The auto industry is notoriously unforgiving 
in terms of  capital expenditure and absent 
high volume or high margins (preferably 
both), cash to invest in future product 
programs can be scarce.  Meanwhile, Vickers 
PLC, the motor company’s parent, was 
interested in pursuing strategic growth in 
marine, propulsion equipment, and turbine 
components.7  Vickers, therefore, announced 
the sale of  Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd. in 
1997.
At first blush, it may seem reasonable to a 
buyer interested in the company to assume that 
the corporate entity held all the assets required 
to manufacture, distribute, and market Rolls-
Royce and Bentley motor vehicles.  On 
March 30, 1998, BMW announced a $560 
million bid for Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd.8 
BMW, then led by Bernd Pischetsrieder, had 
a long history with Rolls-Royce, both the 
aerospace engine company and the motor 
vehicle company.  As far back as the early 
1990’s, BMW was supplying development 
services on engine chassis/body rigidity, 
paint technology, engine ancillaries, and air 
conditioning to Rolls-Royce Motor Cars Ltd.9 
In 1990, BMW and Rolls-Royce PLC (keep 
in mind, a completely separate and unrelated 
entity from the motor company) formed an 
aero engine joint venture in Germany.10 At 
the time the sale was announced, BMW was 
supplying a V12 engine for Rolls-Royce’s 
Silver Seraph model and a V8 engine for the 
Bentley Arnage.11  An important detail in the 
1994 engine supply agreement was BMW’s 
right to cancel the supply of  engines with 
twelve months notice if  Rolls-Royce Motor 
Cars Ltd. was sold to another car company, 
or three years notice if  it was sold to a non-
motor vehicle manufacturer.12
A month later, led by Chairman Ferdinand 
Piech, Volkswagen AG made an offer 
for $720 million.13  In early July the offer 
was increased to $795 million based on 
newer financial statements.14  The offer also 
included an ancillary deal to purchase Vickers’ 
Cosworth engines subsidiary for an additional 
$190 million.15  On June 5, 1998, Vickers 
shareholders agreed to the VW offer.16
It seems axiomatic that in an acquisition 
worth many hundreds of  millions of  dollars, 
trademark attorneys would have been 
integrated into the due diligence process in 
order to identify the nature of  the trademark 
property owned by the target company. 
Arguably, in a company with storied past and 
famous trademarks such as Rolls-Royce and 
Bentley, the trademark is worth more than 
the other assets purchased.  It may also seem 
obvious that the transactional attorneys would 
review material supply agreements prior to 
closing to ensure the target company could 
continue operating its business as it normally 
would while the new owner integrated the 
target into its own processes, which for an 
automobile company can take several years. 
Alas, neither assumptions held true for 
Volkswagen’s acquisition team.
The end result:  Volkswagen had 
paid almost $800 million for a 
premium luxury car company 
but did not have the right to 
use its brand, had no engines, 
plunging sales, and inherited 
an ancient assembly plant and 
cranky British workers.
What followed next was a tripartite punch 
that surely takes the prize for spoiling an 
acquirer’s post-transaction party.  First, lawyers 
for Rolls-Royce PLC notified Volkswagen of  
the 1973 trademark license agreement and 
firmly asserted its rights under the foreign-
ownership clause to retain exclusive control 
of  the Rolls-Royce trademark.17  Second, 
by July 9th, BMW delivered  twelve-months 
notice that it would stop delivering engines to 
Rolls-Royce for the Silver Seraph and Bentley 
Arnage models.18  Third, at around the same 
time, BMW announced it had purchased the 
Rolls-Royce trademark from its technology 
and manufacturing partner Rolls-Royce PLC 
for $65 million.19  One can only speculate 
at the behind-the-scenes strategic meetings 
occurring at BMW at this time.  Led by 
Pischetsrieder, the company had made a bid 
for Rolls-Royce to allow it to grow into ultra-
premium market segments, been outbid by 
Volkswagen, realized (or knew all along) 
the trademark was worth more than the 
assets and was not part of  what Vickers 
PLC was selling, negotiated purchase of  
the trademark from its rightful owner and 
longtime partner (one has to wonder if  
the sale of  its aero engine joint venture 
to Rolls Royce PLC in 2000 was part of  
the negotiations), and then delivered the 
death blow to Volkswagen by cutting off  
supply of  engines for critical products.  The 
end result:  Volkswagen had paid almost 
$800 million for a premium luxury car 
company but did not have the right to use 
its brand, had no engines, plunging sales, 
and inherited an ancient assembly plant and 
cranky British workers.
On July 28 that year, over a round of  golf  
at the Neuburg country club, Pischetsrieder 
and Piech came to a compromise. 
Under the terms of  a Memorandum of  
Understanding, Volkswagen would retain 
the Bentley trademark, the factory in Crewe, 
and its 2400 workers.  BMW would own the 
Rolls-Royce brand, but did not acquire 
any factories, employees, or other assets.20 
While BMW designed a new product and 
built a factory in England (eventually built 
in Goodwood), it would license the Rolls-
Royce brand to Volkswagen until January 
1, 2003.  It would also resume supply 
of  engines to Volkswagen to keep the 
Rolls-Royce Silver Seraph in production. 
Starting in 2003 (when its new factory was 
finished, workers hired, and new product 
(the “Phantom”) developed), BMW would 
regain ownership and control of  the Rolls-
Royce brand.  Graham Morris, the chief  
executive at Rolls-Royce Motors, who had 
promised his staff  that Bentley and Rolls-
Royce would never be split apart, resigned 
as “a matter of  honor.”21
For Volkswagen’s Piech, the settlement 
with BMW was acknowledgement of  a 
costly and embarrassing error in business 
judgment.22  During a press conference, he 
admitted that he would “have liked to have 
kept both brands” and that the purchase 
price would have been “much lower” if  he 
had known it would not have included the 
Rolls-Royce trademark.23
We may never know what led Volkswagen 
to such a disastrous outcome.  Any number 
of  personal and business factors may 
have played a role, from Piech’s ego to a 
lack of  understanding of  the nature of  
BMW’s relationship with Rolls-Royce 
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Motor Cars Ltd.24  On the legal team’s part, 
the transactional attorneys who assisted in 
the deal must have been scratching their 
collective heads over what went wrong. 
Certainly, sloppy due diligence played a role. 
Whether as a result of  not discovering the 
key trademark licensing agreement or simply 
not reading all the documents gathered 
during due diligence, a clearer understanding 
of  the nature of  the trademark license held 
by Rolls-Royce Motor Cars under the 1973 
trademark license agreement with Rolls-Royce 
PLC and the 1994 engine supply agreement 
with BMW would almost certainly have saved 
Volkswagen hundreds of  millions of  dollars. 
Second, there is an important lesson here for 
transactional attorneys who rely too heavily on 
a seller’s representations and warranties rather 
than on due diligence.  While the purchase 
agreement (whether stock or asset) between 
Volkswagen AG and Vickers PLC no doubt 
contained customary representations and 
warranties on what Volkswagen was getting 
for its $790 million, a long and protracted 
court battle over Vickers PLC would almost 
certainly have meant an interruption in 
production of  the Silver Seraph and Arnage 
since a court battle would not have resolved 
BMW’s termination of  the engine supply 
agreement.  Rolls-Royce risked further 
alienation of  its loyal customers if  there was 
a further deterioration of  its precious brand 
image.  Once the extent of  the damage was 
uncovered, therefore, Volkswagen had little 
choice but to compromise with BMW and 
salvage what it could from its $790 million 
purchase.  A tough way to learn the lesson 
caveat emptor.25
There is an epilogue to the story between 
the two executives most involved with 
the acquisition, Pischetsrieder and Piech. 
Pischetsrieder, in spite of  his victory in 
winning Rolls-Royce over Volkswagen, was 
fired a year later from BMW over his handling 
of  another (not quite as successful) BMW 
acquisition, that of  Rover (otherwise known 
in the industry as “The English Patient”).26 
Piech (who took a liking upon Pischetsrieder’s 
negotiation and strategic skills that faithful day 
in July on the golf  course), upon hearing of  
Pischetsrieder’s ouster, immediately offered 
Pischetsrieder a job at Seat, Volkswagen’s 
Spanish subsidiary.  Within two years, 
Pischetsrieder had taken over Piech’s job as 
chief  of  Volkswagen, thus, inheriting the 
newly christened Bentley Motor Cars Ltd. 
(not to mention that old factory in Crewe 
and its cranky workers).27  Looking back, he 
says, “The best stories are written by life.  To 
a certain degree, I regret that I was so clever 
to get Rolls-Royce back from Volkswagen, but 
that’s the way it works.”28  With such dexterity 
to incestuous sheets, indeed.
In spite of  Volkswagen’s tale of  horror, 
many companies still find a tremendous 
amount of  value in licensing their intellectual 
property across borders.  For many U.S. 
companies, licensing a product or technology 
is the most cost efficient and quickest way 
to distribute a product into a foreign market 
where it does not have any experience in 
conducting business.29  The most common 
concern these licensor companies face is 
how to prevent the licensee from using 
the intellectual property forever without 
paying anything either by law, refusal by 
local authorities to enforce the law, or just 
because.  The following contract provisions 
may address some of  these concerns, but 
ultimately the ability of  a licensor to prevent 
the misappropriation or infringement of  its 
intellectual property in a foreign jurisdiction 
is a vexing problem that may have no 
satisfactory solution. 
II. CONTRACT PROVISIONS TO 
CONSIDER
Before considering licensing intellectual 
property to a licensee in another country, an 
initial question should be whether or not the 
laws of  the licensee’s jurisdiction provide the 
same level of  protection for the intellectual 
property you are seeking to license as the 
United States.  While licenses are essentially 
contracts, many jurisdictions lack the same 
common law jurisprudence on contracts that 
the United States enjoys, and thus, sanctity 
of  contract and the parties’ intent when 
contracting may be overlooked.30  As a matter 
of  public policy, a foreign jurisdiction may 
choose not to enforce a license agreement if  
the subject matter licensed is not protected 
under local law since in most jurisdictions 
contracts contrary to public policy are void 
ab initio.31  If  the level of  protection for the 
subject intellectual property in the licensee’s 
jurisdiction is nonexistent or insufficient, then 
contract drafting becomes even more critical, 
particularly choice of  law and forum clauses 
in countries that recognize and enforce 
foreign arbitration awards.32
In addition, clients should be counseled 
the law (and lawyers) can only do so 
much to protect a company’s invaluable 
intellectual property.  No quantum of  
damages or relief, equitable or legal, 
could compensate the publication of  the 
formula of  Coca-Cola on the Internet. 
Clients who adopt too much of  a “let the 
lawyers protect us” attitude will expose 
the company to unnecessary risk as they 
ignore non-legal solutions to any potential 
problems in protecting intellectual property. 
Often, a licensee of  technical information
. . . [T]here is an important 
lesson here for transactional 
attorneys who rely too heavily 
on a seller’s representations 
and warranties rather than 
on due diligence.
has some other business relationship 
with the licensor, such as seller or buyer. 
Changes to the business relationship that 
would result from a breach of  the license 
agreement will often have more persuasive 
effect on a licensee’s compliance with 
the terms and conditions of  a license 
agreement than the remedies provided 
therein, and your business client is a critical 
component in dimensioning that context 
to the licensee. 
The following are contract provisions to 
consider while drafting a license agreement 
for licensing intellectual property across 
borders.
Definitions.  Most license agreements 
rely on the use of  capitalized defined 
terms, so the manner of  definition is 
critical.  The most critical definition in 
the license agreement is the definition 
of  the item or technology to be licensed. 
The rights being licensed should also be 
defined in no uncertain terms.33  Carve 
exclusions for derivatives, new designs, or 
improvements of  the item or technology. 
On the other hand, if  licensee improves 
upon the licensed technology or item, the 
agreement should address which party has 
ownership of  such improvements (i.e., a 
grant-back clause).34  When defining the 
technical information to be used by the 
licensee, an exception should be made 
to exclude technical information that if  
used by licensee would result in licensor 
incurring an obligation to a third party or 
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breaching a confidentiality obligation to a 
third party.  
Contract territory.  One of  the principal 
worries in licensing intellectual property is if  
something were to occur that would cause a 
breach or leak of  intellectual property within 
a particular jurisdiction, that breach or leak 
should be “contained” within the national 
borders of  the licensee’s jurisdiction.  This 
is especially true if  the licensee is near or 
contiguous to a major market for your client. 
If  the leak spills over into a high volume 
. . . [A]n initial question should 
be whether or not the laws 
of the licensee’s jurisdiction 
provide the same level of 
protection for the intellectual 
property you are seeking to 
license as the United States.
market, the damage from the breach may be 
much higher than if  it is contained. A strong 
definition of  the contract territory is a good 
place to start in this containment strategy.35 
Within the scope of  the license grant, 
language should make it clear the licensee 
has the right to use (and/or sell) the licensed 
technology within the contract territory only. 
Local counsel should be consulted to ensure 
the enforceability of  a no re-export provision 
under a jurisdiction’s antitrust or competition 
laws.36
Extent of  licensed rights.  Licenses can 
run the gamut, from exclusive, royalty free, 
worldwide, perpetual, fully transferable, 
to non-exclusive, non-transferable, to use 
a limited amount of  IP in a very specific 
territory, or for a limited time.37  If  the license 
is to be non-exclusive, a clause should be 
inserted expressly reserving the right of  the 
licensor to use and sell the licensed technology 
within the contract territory.38
If  the license of  intellectual property is 
being granted to a joint venture company, 
great care should be taken to control the flow 
of  information to the joint venture itself  and 
not to the partner, especially if  the partner is 
a state owned company or affiliated with a 
foreign government.  
Obligation to support.  If  licensor will have 
an obligation to support licensee’s use of  the 
licensed technology, issues to be addressed 
include when such support may be invoked, 
expenses (i.e., hourly rate, level of  employee 
sent for support, business class airfare if  
long distance travel is involved), and payment 
terms.39
Registration requirements.  Some foreign 
jurisdictions require license agreements, 
particularly those involving intellectual 
property, to be registered with local authorities 
in order to be enforceable.40  If  legal, consider 
a pro forma version of  a license agreement 
with the minimum amount of  information 
necessary to register if  the client wishes to 
keep other terms and conditions secret.  If  
the licensee is an affiliated company of  the 
licensor (i.e., technology holding companies), 
care should be taken not to trip any non-use 
statutes.  Sometimes this problem can be 
solved by registering agreements in foreign 
jurisdictions.
Use restrictions.  The licensor should clearly 
define what uses the licensed technology may 
be used for and exclude all non-defined 
uses.41  In addition, the licensor should seek to 
restrain transfer of  the licensed technology in 
all circumstances and may consider liquidated 
damages in the event of  such a transfer.  Due 
diligence is called for here.  If  a jurisdiction 
does not permit restraints on transfers of  
licensed intellectual property, the client may 
wish to revisit the scope of  the license granted 
or negotiate a lower price for accepting a 
higher risk of  leakage.  
Product labeling.  If  the licensee is permitted 
to use the licensor’s trade name or trademark 
under the license, the extent of  use should 
be clearly defined.  Drafting should also 
provide if  the agreement is assigned under 
any circumstances, the right to use such trade 
name or trademark ceases immediately. 
Payment terms.  Payment terms, while 
generally a business matter for the client 
to negotiate, should be structured carefully 
under applicable local laws.42  The parties 
should specify what currency the fees will 
be paid in and which conversion rate(s) 
will apply.43  The frequency of  payments, 
level of  accounting to be kept by licensee, 
and the licensor’s right to audit should be 
addressed.  If  licensor is to provide support 
services during the term of  the agreement, 
those payment terms should be addressed as 
well.44  Finally, consider whether the payment 
structure raises any issues related to creating 
a permanent establishment for tax purposes 
in the licensee’s jurisdiction.45 
Termination clauses.  Careful consideration 
should be given to how to terminate the 
license, even if  the term is a defined length 
of  time.46  At-will termination is a knife 
that can cut two ways and may be illegal 
in some jurisdictions.  If  termination is 
only permitted upon a material breach, 
will there be an opportunity to cure, and if  
so, how long will such opportunity last?47 
The parties’ obligations upon termination, 
no matter how the termination occurs, 
should be addressed.  At a minimum, the 
licensed technology should be returned 
and destroyed and cessation of  use of  
the licensed technology should occur 
immediately upon termination.48  The 
license agreement must spell out that any 
confidentiality obligations that run with 
the licensed technology shall survive any 
termination for the agreed length of  the 
confidentiality obligation.49  Bankruptcy or 
insolvency of  the licensee should give rise 
to immediate termination by the licensor 
without liability.50  Finally, consider a clause 
similar to the one used by BMW in its 1994 
engine supply agreement that permitted 
BMW to make life unpleasant when 
an acquisition or change or ownership 
occurred.51  Do not forget to account for 
changes in ownership that come about 
either through stock purchase or asset 
purchase.
Compliance with U.S. export controls. 
While some licensees may raise questions 
about this clause, it is critical as part of  
your client’s export compliance efforts 
that licensees are made aware of  your 
obligations with regards to controlled 
technology or software.52
Confidentiality clause.  This clause is 
essential.  Consider limiting individual 
persons and companies that will have access 
to the licensed intellectual property (i.e., 
which employees and subcontractors).  All 
information exchanged with the licensee 
should be deemed confidential unless 
otherwise marked in writing or if  disclosed 
orally, is followed up with an exception in 
writing.  The duration of  the confidentiality 
obligation should be identified,53 and the 
clock should only start at the moment 
of  disclosure.  Finally, the agreement 
should protect for the licensor’s decision 
to withhold information, without being in 
breach of  agreement, until satisfied with 
licensee’s intellectual property secrecy 
measures.54
Assignment.  Licensor should reserve 
the right to assign to affiliated company in 
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case of  reorganization i.e., for tax purposes. 
Licensee is generally not permitted to assign 
for any reason to any entity.
Representations and Warranties.  Licensee 
may seek warranties about the intellectual 
property being licensed, especially with 
regards to potential infringement claims from 
third parties.55  Licensor should seek to limit 
the scope of  these warranties.56  The strongest 
warranty would be “Licensor’s activities do not 
infringe on any third party’s rights.”  A weaker 
form of  the same warranty would be “To 
the best of  Licensor’s knowledge, Licensors’ 
activities do not infringe on any third party’s 
rights.”  Finally, the weakest warranty would 
be “Licensor has not received any written 
notice that its activities infringe a third party’s 
rights.”  Especially in the area of  software 
development, the licensor should ensure it is 
the rightful owner of  any copyrighted works. 
If  the software was not created as work for 
hire, for example, assignment of  title needs 
to be effected before licensor can license 
the software.  If  licensee seeks warranties 
on the registration of  intellectual property 
where registration is required, licensor should 
limit the scope of  the warranty to exclude 
registrations “duly granted” or “valid” as they 
assume additional undertakings beyond mere 
registration.  Both parties should also pay 
close attention to the effect of  exceptions to 
any warranties that are disclosed on separate 
schedules.  These exceptions fall outside the 
scope of  the warranty being provided, and 
the schedules are often not delivered until 
signing of  the license agreement is imminent, 
when the business client is least likely to 
want to re-open negotiations on the basis of  
an unexpected exclusion to a warranty.  Of  
course, warranty language raises issues on 
opinion letters and indemnification, which 
are beyond the scope here.  
Sublicenses.  If  the licensor will permit 
sublicensing of  the intellectual property to 
second or third tier suppliers (i.e. suppliers 
to the licensee), how will enforcement of  the 
license terms on such suppliers be effected? 
Actions upon termination (i.e. destruction 
and return of  the intellectual property 
and cessation of  use) should run to these 
sublicensees as well as the licensee.57  
Taxes.  The burden of  paying income, 
withholding, stamp, registration, turnover, 
value added, and other charges should be 
addressed.58  Be careful of  undervaluing the 
intellectual property for purposes of  reducing 
the taxable basis.  Licensors should demand 
licensee pay the licensor’s taxes and deliver 
tax receipts and should address the issue of  
offsetting taxes due with royalty or payments 
due.  Local counsel should be consulted on 
the legality of  shifting licensor’s tax burden 
to licensee.59  Finally, licensors should seek 
strong indemnification for tax claims against 
licensor.
Choice of  Law.  Sometimes, in spite of  
careful drafting and relationship management, 
intellectual property may be compromised, 
and a foreign jurisdiction may refuse to 
protect what would otherwise be protected 
under U.S. law.60  Under some circumstances, 
a choice of  law clause may be the saving 
grace.  If  a jurisdiction enforces arbitration 
clauses, getting the dispute into a friendly 
arbitral forum that will recognize U.S. law 
on intellectual property and then seeking 
enforcement of  any subsequent arbitral 
award in a foreign jurisdiction may be 
the ticket.61  Before deciding on a choice 
of  law clause, counsel should consider 
what governing local law says about the 
duration of  license agreements, royalty rates, 
ownership of  intellectual property after 
termination, government registrations or 
approvals, export restrictions in the license, 
trademark usage restrictions or requirements 
in the license, obligation to provide future 
improvements in the technology (incremental 
vs. breakthrough), and withholding taxes on 
royalties (who is obligated to pay and what if  
licensee withholds and doesn’t pay).  Some 
jurisdictions will ignore choice of  law and 
apply local licensing laws, in which case a 
clause on conflicts of  law may be helpful.62
Arbitration.  Depending on the licensee’s 
jurisdiction, arbitration may be a necessity 
in the event of  a dispute.63  Counsel should 
advise clients, however, that choice of  law 
and forum clauses only bind the original 
licensee.  If  the licensed intellectual property 
is compromised to non-parties, licensor will 
have to rely on national law enforcement 
for protection of  its intellectual property 
rights – not an attractive proposition in some 
jurisdictions. 
No agency, dealership, or franchise.  This 
clause is important in order to prevent a foreign 
jurisdiction from imposing onerous agency 
protection statutes upon the licensor.
Non-compete clause.  As part of  the license 
grant, the client may wish for business reasons 
to consider a non-compete clause to bind 
the licensee for the license term.  Be sure to 
check with local counsel on the enforceability 
thereof.
Severability, integration, nonwaiver of  
remedies, amendments.  These “boilerplate” 
clauses, while taken for granted in the U.S., 
may provide important protections for the 
licensor, especially in jurisdictions where 
both business practices and local law 
reflect a different approach to business 
negotiations than American mores.   
Language.  Finally, the license agreement 
should provide for which language of  
the license agreement should control 
interpretation in the event translations are 
made.64  The agreement should also address 
what language technical information and 
licensed technology will be made in as well 
as the language of  correspondence and 
notices among the parties.
In addition to careful drafting of  licensing 
agreements to account for local variances 
in law and practice, counsel should also 
give careful consideration to the effects of  
U.S. laws on the technology to be exported 
as well as the destination of  certain 
exports.  The following section provides 
an overview of  these laws, many of  which 
have extraterritorial application and may 
apply to non-U.S. entities.
A Licensing Alternative.  If  a license 
agreement is essentially a covenant not 
to sue, an interesting alternative to a 
license agreement may be appropriate 
in certain limited circumstances.  This 
alternative involves relying solely on the 
law of  contracts to protect the intellectual 
property owner’s rights, sidestepping local 
laws (i.e., on withholding taxes, registration, 
ownership, and alienability rights) on 
license agreements altogether.  Such an 
alternative is most appropriately found in 
a global franchise or sales and distribution 
agreement, and is most appropriate when 
there are a large number of  agreements to 
enter into, in multiple jurisdictions.
Sample language in this license alternative 
may include:
“The Distributor shall not contest the right of  the 
[Principal] to the exclusive use of  any trademark 
or trade name used or claimed by the [Principal], 
and upon written request of  the [Principal], the 
Distributor shall immediately cease or modify, as 
requested by the [Principal], any use or infringement 
by the Distributor of  any such trademark or trade 
name.  The Distributor shall not have or acquire, 
either by usage, custom or operation of  law, any 
right to [Principal’s] trademark, trade name, coined 
word, or combination.”
Caution is advised, however.  Such 
contract language, while serving to put 
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the distributor or agent on notice about 
the intellectual property owner’s rights, 
may not hold up to scrutiny under analysis 
by a local court if  it is deemed to evade 
(and possibly violate) local laws relating to 
license agreements.  It can also invite many 
questions, as it is unfamiliar to most foreign 
practitioners, even those who practice 
intellectual property licensing.  Nonetheless, 
such contract language may fit the bill for the 
narrow purposes described above.
III. EXPORT CONTROLS: BIS, 
OAC, OFAC AND DTDC65 
Most exports out of  the United States, 
including exports of  technology and 
intellectual property via licensing, do not 
require any sort of  specific approval from the 
U.S. government.66  Exporting, however, is a 
privilege, not a right, and what the government 
giveth, the government can taketh away. 
Before the terrorist attacks of  September 
11, 2001, the U.S. export control regime was 
treated by most attorneys as a wayward child. 
It was something to keep in mind, but not 
something to be overly concerned about. 
That child has grown up now, and it demands 
the full attention of  all counsel involved in 
cross-border transactions, including (and 
in some cases, especially) international 
intellectual property licensing.  Increased 
enforcement vigor by a U.S. government with 
a laser-focus on national security means that 
U.S. companies must continue to pay extreme 
heed to export controls and trade sanctions 
for the foreseeable future.67
From a legal perspective, the U.S. export 
control regime is fairly complicated but 
not indecipherable.  Interpretation of  gray 
areas within the rules (and there are many) 
often will result in the most conservative 
interpretation possible by government 
agencies (especially when asked to put it in 
writing), a result that would almost certainly 
grind a significant amount of  commerce to 
a halt.  On the other hand, an overly cavalier 
attitude towards the regime will almost 
certainly deliver consequences of  the most 
unpleasant variety – negative publicity, heavy 
fines, and the possibility of  prison sentences. 
With practice, most attorneys can become 
skilled at navigating the various statutes, 
regulations, and agencies that administer and 
enforce the regimes.  Counsel who do not 
practice in this area on a regular basis are 
advised to seek counsel who are well versed 
and well practiced, however, as the nuances 
and subtleties in agencies’ interpretation 
of  the applicable law can change with the 
political winds.  This section will deliver an 
introductory overview of  the most important 
export control laws which all intellectual 
property counsel should be familiar with.
OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL 
(“OFAC”)68
The Treasury Department’s OFAC 
administers trade sanctions and embargoes 
against particular countries and entities. 
Currently, countries subject to economic 
sanctions include the Balkans, Burma 
(Myanmar), Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, 
North Korea, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.69 
Permitted activities differ under each 
country’s sanctions regime and range from 
a “soft” embargo (i.e. Liberia, where the 
sanctions regime seeks to limit imports of  
rough diamonds into the United States70 and 
Zimbabwe, which seeks mainly to prevent 
President Robert Mugabe and his family 
and senior officers from entering the United 
States)71 to a complete trade embargo (i.e. 
Cuba)72.  Special care should be taken with the 
Cuban regime sanction (based on the Trading 
With the Enemy Act), which expressly applies 
to foreign subsidiaries and branches of  U.S. 
companies, wherever located,73 and includes a 
travel ban to Cuba.74  Special attention should 
be paid to Trading With the Enemy Act-based
Exporting . . . is a privilege, 
not a right, and what the 
government giveth, the 
government can taketh away.
sanctions programs (which apply to the 
Cuban, North Korean, and certain portions 
of  the Iranian sanctions programs) due to the 
heavy penalties associated with violations.75 
The sanctions regimes administered by OFAC 
are made even more confusing by recent 
actions relaxing the export of  agricultural 
and in some instances, medical products 
to sanctioned countries.  These exports are 
tightly regulated and prior approval by OFAC 
is necessary.  “Blocking” legislation designed 
to prevent the extraterritorial reach of  U.S. law 
on foreign-incorporated entities may create 
an uncomfortable situation for a foreign 
subsidiary faced with the choice of  disobeying 
U.S. or local law.  Other sanctions regimes, 
while not directly applicable to foreign-
incorporated subsidiaries of  U.S. companies 
(they still apply to foreign branches of  U.S. 
companies and U.S. citizens everywhere), 
prevent the “approval” or “facilitation” 
of  prohibited transactions by U.S. parent 
companies and U.S. employees.  OFAC 
takes an extremely broad application of  
these words – caution is strongly advised.
OFAC also maintains sanctions against 
entities deemed to be hostile to U.S. 
interests.  Currently, these regimes’ targets 
include narcotic traffickers, the Taliban, 
terrorists, and proliferation of  weapons of  
mass destruction.  OFAC also maintains a 
list of  “Specially Designated Nationals” 
and “blocked persons” that persons and 
entities subject to OFAC jurisdiction must 
not deal with and block assets of.76  The 
list of  governments, companies, persons 
and organizations that are off-limits to 
persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction changes 
constantly, and companies of  all sizes 
involved in trading activities must maintain 
strong compliance programs including the 
use of  automated screening software.77 
As many of  these entities are based in the 
United States, even companies that conduct 
business exclusively in the United States 
should be checking their customers against 
OFAC’s lists.78
OFAC maintains a compliance hotline 
that allows companies and individuals 
with questions to speak with a compliance 
officer.  Calls are ostensibly handled on 
a confidential basis.  Counsel is advised, 
however, to either block caller identification 
systems or to seek information via outside 
counsel, in order to maintain complete 
confidentiality and the privilege.  In 
addition, do not expect OFAC compliance 
officers to interpret the law more clearly 
than what is already publicly available. 
One OFAC spokesman, when asked how 
fines were determined in a case involving 
the importation of  Cuban cigars in 2000, 
unhelpfully replied, “There are a variety of  
ways to determine the fine.”79  In another 
case, job search assistance website Monster.
com decided it had to scrub mention of  
OFAC-sanctioned countries from all its 
online resumes, resulting in charges of  
discrimination from Americans of  Iranian 
descent.80  OFAC, while claiming it did 
not ask Monster.com to make the move, 
insisted that the company had interpreted 
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the law correctly.81  Most compliance officers 
will answer questions broadly, err on the 
side of  conservative interpretation, and 
recommend the filing of  a license application 
to obtain a definitive answer.
Counsel are often asked by clients to predict 
when sanctions against a particular country 
may be lifted.  Such tea-leaf  reading is a 
dangerous task when it comes to sanctions 
on regimes for the political winds can 
shift suddenly.  For example, the Burmese 
sanctions regime prohibited, for a long time, 
new investment in Burma while permitting 
exports and imports.82  After the arrest of  
Counsel are often asked 
by clients to predict when 
sanctions against a particular 
country may be lifted.  Such 
tea-leaf reading is a dangerous 
task . . .
Nobel Peace Prize winner and winner of  
the last democratic election Aung Sung Suu 
Kyi, the United States tightened the sanctions 
noose around Burma with Congressional 
passage of  the Burmese Freedom and 
Democracy Act of  2003 on July 23, 2003, and 
an Executive Order the next day, prohibiting 
the import of  any “product of  Burma” and 
the export of  financial services to Burma.83
A final word of  caution, OFAC has recently 
announced a rule that would make disclosures 
of  identities of  companies that have settled 
allegations of  violations of  the sanctions 
regimes.84  These disclosures occur even if  a 
company voluntarily disclosed an inadvertent 
violation (most often this occurs when a 
foreign subsidiary, without malicious intent, 
engages in some form of  prohibited conduct 
or when a U.S. parent company provides some 
form of  support or facilitation to such foreign 
affiliate) and even if  a company denies any 
wrongdoing and has not been adjudicated 
responsible in any administrative tribunal or 
court.  This rule is fresh out of  the comment 
phase,85 and OFAC has started publishing 
the identities of  alleged violators.86  Public 
recriminations against the companies involved 
quickly followed.87
BUREAU OF INDUSTRY AND SECURITY 
(“BIS”)
The BIS88 administers the Export 
Administration Regulations (“EAR”),89 which 
control the export of  dual-use items (dual-use 
items are those that have both military and 
commercial applications).  Every export out 
of  the United States is potentially subject 
to the EAR.  Additionally, exports from 
countries other than the United States are 
subject to the EAR if  they are re-exports of  
U.S.-origin commodities and technical data, 
contain U.S.-origin parts and components 
used in the manufacture of  a foreign end-
product (subject to de minimis exceptions), 
non-U.S. produced direct products that 
result from U.S.-origin technical data, or 
commodities produced by a plant or major 
component of  a plant located outside the 
United States that is the direct product of  
U.S.-origin technology or software.90  Analysis 
under the EAR typically asks five questions: 
(1) What are you exporting? (2) Where is it 
going? (3) Who is the ultimate end-user? (4) 
What is the ultimate end use of  the product? 
and (5) What else does your end-user do, such 
as contracting or financing?91  Depending 
on the answers to these questions, an export 
license may be required before shipment. 
Additionally, information from the EAR 
is usually required to complete a Shipper’s 
Export Declaration (“SED”).92
One area of  particular concern surrounds 
that of  “deemed exports.”  Under the 
“deemed export” rule, an export can occur 
within the borders of  the United States if  
covered technology or source code is released 
to a covered foreign national (i.e., a tourist, 
student, employee, or academic).  Care should 
be taken in any licensing arrangement to 
ensure the burden of  compliance with the 
EAR (including the deemed export rule) is 
clearly spelled out.  Last year, BIS commenced 
the first criminal prosecution based on the 
deemed export rule by seeking indictment of  
two California companies and their presidents 
for “exporting” controlled technology to 
Chinese nationals in the U.S.93
OFFICE OF ANTIBOYCOTT COMPLIANCE 
(“OAC”)
Anyone doing business (not merely 
exporting, but conducting all aspects of  
business including negotiations) with persons 
or entities in the Middle East needs to be 
mindful of  U.S. antiboycott laws.  The OAC, 
actually a division of  BIS, administers the 
antiboycott provisions of  the EAR94, while 
the Internal Revenue Service administers 
the antiboycott provisions of  the Internal 
Revenue Code.  Both laws seek to prohibit 
U.S. companies from complying with the 
Arab League boycott of  Israel.95
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE 
CONTROLS96
The Directorate of  Defense Trade 
Controls (formerly Office of  Defense 
Trade Controls, or OTDC) administers the 
International Traffic in Arms Regulations 
(“ITAR”).97  The ITAR seeks to control the 
export of  defense articles and services, as 
listed on the United States Munitions List 
(“USML”).98  Companies which seek to 
export or re-export items on the USML 
must obtain prior permission from the 
DDTC.  Additionally, licenses must be 
obtained before importing, even on a 
temporary basis, certain items.  Companies 
wishing to apply for a license must first 
register with the OTDC.  Registration is 
a simple process, but must be undertaken 
on a regular basis in order to prevent 
registrations from lapsing.
Special care and attention should 
be paid by companies seeking to enter 
into license agreements to provide a 
defense service.  Such agreements may 
include manufacturing license agreements, 
technical license agreements, distribution 
agreements, or off-shore procurement 
agreements.  These agreements may not 
enter into force without approval from 
DDTC and must be deposited with DDTC. 
In addition, the agreements must contain 
a certain level of  information including 
statutorily-prescribed clauses.99
CONCLUSION
By and large, negotiating and drafting 
international intellectual property licenses 
is an enjoyable practice for most attorneys. 
Unlike joint ventures or distributorships, 
these licensing arrangements almost always 
involve a “win-win” business relationship 
between licensor and licensee.  While 
horror stories can be found especially in the 
area of  licensing in a merger or acquisition 
context or complying with the U.S. export 
control regime, careful attention to drafting, 
due diligence, and legal compliance will 
go a long way to mitigate those risks and 
concerns and keep the ghost of  Hamlet’s 
father away for a very long time.
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